Europe
Religious Identity in a
Fragmented Age
Olivier Roy
European University Institute

Abstract: The author offers a reflection on the question of Christian
identity in a changing Europe. He points out that it was only as the
number of practicing Christians in public life diminished that the question of the Christian identity of the continent arose. He questions the
kinds of uncritical identification of European and Christian culture
that arises in the fact of increased Islamic immigration. He surveys the
principal options facing Christians and Christian culture as Europe
faces an uncertain future.
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I

t is a pleasure to be here again at Sophia University Institute,
among many friends and colleagues. During the 1950s, while
what was to become the European Union was being launched,
the majority of its founding fathers—Schuman, De Gasperi,
Monnet, and others—were practicing Catholics. For them, Catholicism was not just an identity but formed the basis of their
entire moral and religious framework. Yet, it was an era in which
no one felt the need to mention a Christian identity. It was simply
not a subject of debate, a nonissue, and the founding documents
reflect this situation.
The debate around Europe’s Christian identity was to begin
only in the late 1990s, a time when this initial situation no longer
applied. At this time, the number of practicing Christians in public life had greatly diminished. Christianity, which had in the earlier period been a nonissue, could no longer be taken for granted.
The question of so-called Christian identity had begun to emerge
in an increasingly secularized Europe.
We should recognize that, in a sense, the expression “European
culture” is a vague one. I will not attempt to change that here.
Nevertheless, as implied above, in the early decades of what was to
become the European Union, there was little or no gap between
shared societal values and Christian values. In fact, most existing
secular values at that time were simply secularized Christian values. Whether we look at the concept of the family, ideas regarding
the “good” and “bad,” or values relating to sexuality, we do not find
much difference between Christian and secular moral frameworks
in this earlier period.
Perhaps an example will make my meaning clear. We could
take the case of the debate over the contraceptive pill in the 1960s.
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In France, Jeannette Vermeersch, the wife of the general secretary
of the French Communist Party, opposed contraception, saying
“contraception was a capitalist plot to destroy the worker families.”
From our vantage point, this meant she was advocating what we
today call family values. At that time, these were seen as values of
the working class. Going back even further, we can note that when
the French parliament voted in 1921 to permit abortions, this was
not seen as a church issue at all; rather it came from a kind of a
nationalist reaction to the conclusion of World War 1. Many considered it to be more a demographic issue than a political one, or
question of values.
In brief, we can say that until the 1960s, little or no gap existed
between secular and Christian sectors of society. In fact, if anything, there was often an association between hard-core believers
and atheists during this time. France’s fight over the concept of
laicité (secularity) was not a fight of values but rather a fight about
political power and control of society. There was, of course, a fight
between the secular state and the church, but, compared with the
current European experience, a very significant difference. Before
the 1960s, in general, secularists were still religiously literate, with
a baseline knowledge of religion, many having attended Catholic schools. At some level, in other words, they “knew” religious
teachings.
So, we might ask: What changed in the 1960s that caused the
development of a divide not present in prior decades? The change,
I believe, was in the predominantly secular culture itself. Over a
span of some years we witnessed extraordinary, historical changes
in value systems, almost all concentrated around issues relating to
family and sexuality, the definition of a family, and what constitutes
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sexual freedom. Furthermore, the notion of sexual freedom had
not been considered under the control of the church, so to speak,
before that time.
However it happened that, to respond to the problems posed by
such rapid societal changes, the Catholic Church tried to offer its
own immediate solution by releasing the encyclical Humanae Vitae.
This encyclical was a surprise for everyone at the time because
Vatican II had already been viewed as the church’s theological response to increasing secularization. Faced with this encyclical, the
general public, including Christians, saw it almost as a step backward, to a time before Vatican II. In reality, it was not a backward
move at all. Instead, the encyclical recognized what could be described as two different societies, two different sets of values. And
it is a concept that has been affirmed in different ways by every
pope since. Thus, we recognize that from the time of Humanae
Vitae onward, European values should no longer be regarded simply as secularized Christian values.
This fact is responsible for many of the challenges before us.
After this division created what I would call the “moral diversity”
in Europe, can we continue to speak of Europe’s Christian identity? What does Christian identity now mean?
The term “identity” brings us into contact with the complexity of our situation. Christian identity is not simply identical to
Christian religion, Christian culture, or Christian values. The problematic term “Christian identity” has quite a history. Everyone in
Europe claims an identity and does so in a constantly evolving situation. To give just one example (this is not an in-depth analysis),
we are faced with many regional and political claims, from Scotland to Catalunya, to having an “identity.” What does the concept
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of identity truly mean? Is it a language? Not always. Is it a way of
life? A normative set of values? I would say that the term is almost
void of any real meaning. And this is precisely the problem.
So, when opposition to immigration or to Islam comes to the
fore, and we hear talk of Europe’s identity, or, more specifically,
about a Christian, European identity, we must ask ourselves what
this means precisely. In Germany or Holland, for instance, government questionnaires for refugees and visa applicants ask if the
applicant accepts European values. What are these values? One
question in Germany, for example, regards the acceptance of nudity, because according to the questions posed, this is considered
commonplace in Germany. So, if you say “No, No, No” in answer
to this question, you are out. Similarly, most country questionnaires ask questions regarding homophobia. Forty years ago, it
would have made no sense to ask such a question: Homosexuality
was a crime in most of Europe until the 1960s. Now the situation
is quite different: Homosexuality is legally protected and considered a part of the European value system.
Again, how in today’s world do we continue to speak about
European values, or the roots of our European identity, in a situation where societal values and norms have so rapidly shifted in
forty short years? We can no longer refer to an imaginary European identity still rooted in the Roman Empire, or in the Middle
Ages, or in the Renaissance or the period of the Enlightenment, or
in Christianity. Europe is clearly dominated by a secular culture,
which is no longer a secularized, Christian culture.
Since Humanae Vitae, then, the clash between the church and
society has increasingly been about values. It is not so obviously
about theology. Currently, we are seeing Polish people block their
borders, to prevent the entrance of refugees into the country. They
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see it as a way of protecting Poland’s Christian identity. One archbishop was prompted to remind priests that they are not under any
obligation to attend these demonstrations. This is because what is
called the Christian identity of Poland, and we can say of Europe,
is not based on Christian values.
I am not suggesting that governments should implement Christian values. Current populist movements throughout Europe are,
in fact, expressions of contemporary secular society, even if some
have their roots in traditional extreme right-wing ideologies, such
as fascism. All these populist movements—perhaps with the exception of the Italian League party (formerly Lega Nord)—are
“modern” in terms of values. Thus, the Dutch far-right leader
Geert Wilders objects to Islam because of its positions on women’s
and homosexual rights. Even in France, the nation now is promoting laicité rather than Christian identity. While Marine Le Pen’s
father wished to defend France’s Christian identity, his daughter is
more concerned with defending France’s secular identity.
Thus, secular and Christian members of society tend to drift in
separate directions. An ever-increasing divide between faith communities and the secular majority is becoming markedly evident.
In France, Catholic faith communities, rather than the institutional church, are beginning to resist the secular agenda: There
now exists a militant Catholic movement called La Manif pour
Tous that took to the streets. It is the first time in a century that
Catholics are going to the streets as Catholics. Thus, we are seeing
a kind of radicalization of faith communities. This is true not just
in the Catholic world but also among some Protestant Evangelicals and Orthodox Jews, who oppose shifts in Europe’s values.
The Catholic Church itself is increasingly acknowledging the
fact that at this moment in history, Christian communities are
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a minority. And this is still something new. Until recently, the
prevailing idea was that European culture is Christian and that
Europeans have forgotten this and should return to their religious
roots. But in the face of ever increasing secularization, it is clear
that this kind of discourse is ineffective. People are not returning
to their religious roots. Indeed, in some countries, such as France,
religion is now seen by many as the problem. If you take a poll of
the population and ask people in France what does laicité mean,
most will tell you that religion should be kept in the private sphere.
Freedom of religion, however, is the freedom to practice the religion. It is not just the freedom of belief. You have the right to
practice, and, by definition, you practice in the public sphere. So,
there is a discrepancy between the law and how people interpret
the law, which is now more and more ideological.
So, with the divide between faith communities and the predominant culture growing, what kinds of actions are needed?
What is needed at this point in Europe’s history? Until now, most
faith communities have chosen one of three options. The first is
what I would call the re-conquest option. This includes actions such
as the legal fight to ban abortion, trying to impose teaching of
religion in schools, and so on. We see examples of this option
in Poland today and in many predominantly Muslim countries.
There are, in fact, marked similarities between what’s happening
today in countries such as Poland and Turkey. This option of attempting a “re-conquest” of lost values serves only to isolate faith
communities more and more instead of building bridges. Over the
past thirty years we have seen that leaders who fight against new,
secular legislation around issues, such as abortion, gay marriage,
and civil unions, almost always lose.
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A second option, which Jürgen Habermas discussed with Cardinal Ratzinger years ago, is what I would call the “translation” of
religious values into acceptable secular values. Instead of speaking
about abortion, speak about life. French Cardinal Philippe Barbarin, for example, chose a similar path in the same-sex marriage
debate. He never said that it is against religious laws, values, or
teachings but rather that it is a decision that would have a negative
sociological and anthropological impact on society. This tactical
option found some support among a small number of psychologists and others and some Christian families. But for the most
part, it too failed to be particularly effective.
The third option is also the title of a recent (bestselling) book
by American author Rod Dreher, The Benedict Option. All is considered lost and we are now in the hands of the barbarians. Faced
with a loss of Christian values, we can withdraw into faith communities, like the Benedictines did, not necessarily by building
actual monasteries but by creating more “social monasteries.” We
must ask: Why not try this third option? If we let each sector of
society fight to maintain its own specific identity, we remain a
fragmented Europe. We would have faith communities and other
groups based on their own different, regional identities. Europe
would be transformed into a set of small pieces, all different from
one another.
It is of primary importance for secular states to acknowledge
and make allowances for religion while maintaining the distinction between civil society and religion. It is not a matter of legality but rather of how religion is perceived. Persons of religious
faith must be open to dialogue, acknowledge that they may be in
the minority, and understand that dialogue is not facilitated by
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continuous fighting against current societal norms and values. In
Europe, we are not short on convictions; we have convictions of
every sort. We have Christians who have converted to Islam, Muslims who have converted to Christianity, and persons of religious
faith who have embraced a deeply secular outlook. What is needed
is to reopen and rediscover this historically important relationship
between the secular and the religious and the relationships among
those of different religions.
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